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FAMILIES
Manhattan Court Rebuffs Ex-Partner Custody Claim
Trial judge won’t apply, extend scope of NY high court’s 2016 co-parenting precedent
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
M anhattan State Su-preme Court Jus-tice Frank P. Nervo ruled on April 11 
that the former same-sex part-
ner of a woman who adopted a 
child from Africa after the wom-
en’s relationship ended could 
not maintain a lawsuit seeking 
custody and visitation with the 
child based on the relationship 
she developed with the child af-
ter the adoption took place.
In one of the fi rst applications 
of last August’s historic New York 
Court of Appeals co-parent rul-
ing in Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth 
A.C.C., Nervo found that plain-
tiff Kelly Gunn failed to show by 
“clear and convincing evidence” 
that she and her former partner, 
Circe Hamilton, had agreed to 
adopt and raise the child togeth-
er. Such evidence would have 
brought the case within the 
conceptual sphere — if not the 
precise holding — of the Brooke 
S.B. precedent.
Gunn announced she will ap-
peal the ruling to the Appellate 
Division’s First Department in 
Manhattan, and seek an exten-
sion of the 20-day stay Nervo 
put on his ruling.
Nervo’s consideration of the 
2016 precedent from the state’s 
highest bench was complicated 
by its limitations. Brooke S.B. 
was a consolidation of two sep-
arate cases, both involving do-
nor insemination where former 
partners planned for and car-
ried out their child’s birth as 
part of their relationship, with 
an explicit mutual agreement 
they would both be parents. In 
both cases, the couples lived 
together with the child before 
separating.
Gunn’s case posed different 
facts.
In its Brooke S.B. ruling, 
written by the late Judge Shei-
la Abdus-Salaam, the Court of 
Appeals cautiously abandoned 
its prior bright line test, under 
which a biologically-unrelated 
same-sex co-parent was treat-
ed as a legal stranger without 
standing to seek custody or vis-
itation. The 2016 ruling made a 
specific exception for situations 
where a parental relationship 
was created by mutual consent 
within the context of donor in-
semination.
“Because we necessarily de-
cide these cases based on the 
facts presented to us,” Abdus-
Salaam wrote in that case, “it 
would be premature for us to 
consider adopting a test for sit-
uations in which a couple did 
not enter into a pre-conception 
agreement. Accordingly, we do 
not now decide whether, in a 
case where a biological or adop-
tive parent consented to the 
creation of a parent-like re-
lationship between his or her 
partner and child after concep-
tion, the partner can establish 
standing to seek visitation and 
custody.”
Gunn and Hamilton, who en-
tered into a cohabitation agree-
ment” in 2007, were together 
until 2009. “It is undisputed 
that during their relationship, 
they entered into a plan to adopt 
and raise a child together,” 
Nervo wrote. “It is also undis-
puted that the parties’ relation-
ship deteriorated over time and 
they entered into a separation 
agreement on May 28, 2010.”
About 10 months later, Ham-
ilton learned that a child was 
available for adoption in Ethio-
pia and took steps to complete 
the adoption. Gunn claims 
that despite their separation, 
she facilitated the adoption 
through a substantial mon-
etary payment as part of their 
separation agreement, which 
made it possible for Hamilton 
to “establish a home sufficient 
to pass inspection by the adop-
tion agency.”
Gunn also arranged a busi-
ness trip so she could travel 
with Hamilton and the child, 
Abush, on the London-to-New 
York part of Hamilton’s trip 
home after getting custody of 
the boy in Ethiopia. Gunn pre-
sented evidence of her continu-
ing relationship with Abush, 
though she conceded “her in-
volvement with the child was 
limited because [Hamilton] 
would disapprove.”
Hamilton argued that the 
couple’s plan to adopt and raise 
a child together “dissolved con-
temporaneously with the disso-
lution of the parties’ relation-
ship.” Gunn’s involvement after 
she adopted the child, Hamilton 
asserted, was “only a support-
ive role as a close friend.” Gunn 
was “merely a godmother,” not 
a parent, said Hamilton, who 
argued she did not “encourage, 
facilitate, or condone a paren-
tal relationship” between Gunn 
and the boy, who is now seven 
years old.
In attempting to adapt the 
Brooke S.B. ruling to the facts 
in this case, Nervo interpreted 
the earlier case to extend to an 
adoption situation — but only 
if the plaintiff could show, by 
clear and convincing evidence, 
that the parties planned to 
adopt the child and raise it 
together and carried out their 
plan within the context of their 
continuing relationship. He 
found that the two women had 
such a plan prior to their sepa-
ration, but it did not continue 
through the adoption process 
and the raising of the child.
The timing of Gunn’s lawsuit 
is interesting. Hamilton adopt-
ed Abush in 2011, but Gunn did 
not file her lawsuit until Sep-
tember 1, 2016, two days after 
the Court of Appeals decided 
Brooke S.B. Prior to then, her 
suit would have been blocked by 
the earlier precedent the Court 
of Appeals overruled, Alison D. 
v. Virginia M. from 1991. In an 
April 20 article, the New York 
Times reported that Gunn went 
to court “to prevent her former 
partner… from moving to her 
native London” with the child. 
Her complaint first went be-
fore Justice Matthew F. Cooper, 
who issued an interim order re-
straining Hamilton from relo-
cating Abush to London while 
the case was pending. The case 
was then assigned to Nervo, 
who held hearings sporadical-
ly from last September 8 until 
February 16 of this year.
Nervo’s ruling this month 
granted Hamilton’s motion 
to dismiss the case, denied 
Gunn’s motion, and vacated 
Justice Cooper’s order restrain-
ing Hamilton’s travel to London 
with Abush. However, recogniz-
ing that Gunn would likely ap-
peal and could have grounds to 
argue that last year’s Court of 
Appeals’ precedent should be 
given a broader reading, Nervo 
stayed his order for 20 days. 
A prompt appeal could extend 
that stay while the case gets 
appellate review.
In a lengthy summary of tes-
timony from both women, Nervo 
wrote, “Upon the presentation of 
the evidence of both parties over 
36 days of testimony, constitut-
ing a hearing transcript of 4,738 
pages, 215 exhibits on behalf of 
petitioner, and 126 exhibits on 
behalf of respondent, the court 
finds the petitioner has on nu-
merous occasions stated that 
she did not want to be a par-
ent and gave no indication to ei-
ther respondent or third parties 
that she either wanted this role 
or acted as a parent. Therefore, 
she has failed to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence 
that she has standing as a par-
ent” in line with the Brooke S.B. 
precedent.
The court never addressed 
the best interest of the child, 
usually a key finding in a cus-
tody dispute, because a plain-
tiff must first establish their 
status as a parent or other-
wise show some extraordinary 
circumstances. Part of Gunn’s 
argument on appeal will likely 
be that Brooke S.B. implicitly 
overruled the extraordinary 
circumstances requirement in 
cases involving same-sex part-
ners who had jointly planned to 
raise a child together — even 
in cases not involving donor 
insemination or a continuous 
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relationship.
Reading through Nervo’s 
summary of the evidence — 
which is unlikely to be upset 
on appeal, as appellate courts 
generally refrain from second-
guessing trial judges’ findings 
of facts in custody and visita-
tion cases — it seems he con-
cluded that while Gunn has 
formed a relationship with 
Abush perhaps deeper than 
a mere acquaintanceship or 
what a babysitter might forge, 
there was significant evidence 
she had expressed reservations 
during her relationship with 
Hamilton about the adoption 
plans and had never directly 
communicated to her ex-part-
ner after the adoption that she 
desired to take on co-parenting 
responsibilities. 
Given the Court of Appeals’ 
emphasis last year that stand-
ing would arise from a mutual 
agreement between the child’s 
biological or adoptive parent 
and her same-sex partner, the 
lack of evidence of such an 
agreement at or after the time 
of this adoption meant this 
case could not be made to fit 
precisely into the Brooke S.B. 
precedent.
At the same time, since the 
Court of Appeals specifically 
stated last year it was not rul-
ing on factual situations differ-
ent from those in Brooke S.B., 
the Appellate Division could 
take a different view. 
The Court of Appeals clearly 
rejected the bright line test of 
the old Alison D. v. Virginia M. 
case, but whether it will coun-
tenance a broader exception to 
the standing rules it carved out 
last year is uncertain. 
Gunn’s attorney, Nancy 
Chemtob, told the New York 
Times, “I believe that this deci-
sion doesn’t follow Brooke.” 
The Times reported that 
“Bonnie Rabin, one of Ms. Ham-
ilton’s lawyers, said the ruling 
should allay concerns that a 
trusted caretaker could sud-
denly claim parental rights un-
der the state’s expanded defini-
tion of parentage. ‘That would 
be scary to parents,’ she said.”
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